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## Schelling's *Clara*—Editors' Obscurity

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Schelling's *Clara, or on Nature's Connection to the Spirit World* is a work that has received little attention in the English-speaking world,<sup>1</sup> but which is described by some German commentators as Schelling's most popular work.<sup>2</sup> It was first published posthumously as a fragment in 1861 by K. F. A. Schelling,<sup>3</sup> Schelling's son, as part of the *Sämmtliche Werke*, these latter remaining even today as the standard reference source for Schelling.<sup>4</sup> *Clara* has a unique character; like Schelling's *Bruno*<sup>5</sup> it too is essentially in the form of a discussion, but *Clara* differs from *Bruno* insofar as it has more the flavor of a story or tale. Indeed Ehrenberg notes that it could almost be called a discursive novel [*Gesprächsroman*].<sup>6</sup> It is an appealing work not only because of its accessibility, but also because it was written shortly after the death of Schelling's wife, Caroline (née Michaelis, first marriage to Johann Böhmer, second marriage to August Wilhelm Schlegel, third and final marriage to Schelling).<sup>7</sup> This lends the work, which deals with the theme of life after death, a particularly poignant character.

1. A translation of this work is forthcoming as: F. W. J. Schelling, *Clara: Or, On Nature's Connection to the Spirit World*, trans. Fiona Steinkamp (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 2002).

2. See, for example, p. 36 of F. Horn's *Schelling and Swedenborg. Mysticism and German Idealism*, trans. George F. Dole (West Chester, Penn.: Swedenborg Foundation, 1997). The work is popular in the sense that it is written for the general public and not just for philosophers. It is also popular in the sense that there have been six separate editions of the work published. However, there has been relatively little critical notice of this text by philosophers and thus has not received much popular attention among philosophers.

3. "Schelling" in this essay always refers to F. W. J. Schelling. His son will always be referred to in the text with his initials, i.e., explicitly as K. F. A. Schelling.

4. The *Schelling Kommission* of the *Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften* in Munich is gradually replacing the *Sämmtliche Werke* with the *Historisch-kritische Ausgabe*. For now, however, the *Sämmtliche Werke* still remain the main reference source for Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856–61). All page numbers to citations from *Clara* in this essay (apart from the "Spring" fragment) refer to Volume 9. All translations of *Clara* are my own unless otherwise stated.

5. F. W. J. Schelling, *Bruno, or on the Natural and Divine Principle of Things*, trans. Michael G. Vater (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1984).

6. See H. Ehrenberg, ed., "Über Unsterblichkeit" (introductory essay), in F. W. J. Schelling, *Clara. Oder über den Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt* (Stuttgart: Frommanns Verlag, 1922), p. 17.

7. Horn (p. 20) wrongly describes Caroline as having been married to Friedrich Schlegel. For a biography of Caroline see, for example, E. Klessmann, *Caroline* (Munich: List Verlag, 1975). There is some controversy over the dating of *Clara* with Schelling's son placing

Because of its popular potential, Schelling's son later published *Clara* in its own right in 1862 as a separate text.<sup>8</sup> An identical second edition followed just three years later.<sup>9</sup> However, in both of these single versions of the work, K. F. A. Schelling left out the "Introduction" that had been printed in the *Sämmtliche Werke* and added a section of text (the "Spring" fragment) that he had not previously published. In 1913 Kuhlenbeck brought out another single edition of *Clara*, this version including the "Introduction" but omitting the "Spring" fragment.<sup>10</sup> Just nine years later, Ehrenberg prepared yet another version of *Clara*<sup>11</sup> that omitted not only the "Introduction" and the "Spring" fragment but also what Schröter later called "the fourth discussion"<sup>12</sup>—this latter, omitted section comprises the last nineteen pages of the text appearing in the *Sämmtliche Werke*. In 1948 Manfred Schröter brought out what was now the fifth single edition of *Clara* and, once more, this version differed from the ones that preceded it.<sup>13</sup> Like Ehrenberg, Schröter discarded the "Introduction," but unlike Ehrenberg he kept the fourth discussion in keeping with the other editions. But, unlike the Kuhlenbeck and Ehrenberg editions of *Clara*, Schröter added the "Spring" fragment. Schröter claims that the "Spring" fragment was a newly found fragment but, given that this fragment had already been published in the very first single edition of *Clara* over eighty years earlier, this is clearly wrong.<sup>14</sup> In his epilogue Schröter also includ-

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it somewhere between 1816–17 (see K. F. A. Schelling, ed., "Editor's Foreword," in F. W. J. Schelling, *Clara, oder über den Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt* [Stuttgart: Cotta'scher Verlag, 1862]), but, e.g., Horn, Tilliette (X. Tilliette, *Schelling. Une Philosophie en Devenir. Vol. 1* [Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1970]), and Schröter all believe Schelling wrote *Clara* in 1810, shortly after Caroline's death.

8. K. F. A. Schelling, ed., "Editor's Foreword," in F. W. J. Schelling, *Clara* (1862). In this foreword K. F. A. Schelling claims that he is publishing the work as a single edition due to public demand. This single edition was the first time that the work appeared under the title *Clara*. The son explains that he added the name "Clara" to the title to follow the example of *Bruno* and to continue the tradition since Plato of naming philosophical discussions after one of the characters in the discussion (see p. iv). The name *Clara* has stuck ever since. Indeed, Schröter even added the name to the title in the index of the Jubiläum edition of Schelling's works, even though the original *Sämmtliche Werke* apparently did not include the name (see K. F. A. Schelling, "Editor's Foreword").

9. K. F. A. Schelling, ed., "Editor's Foreword to the First Edition," in F. W. J. Schelling, *Clara, oder Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Cotta'scher Verlag, 1865).

10. L. Kuhlenbeck, ed., "Editor's Foreword," in F. W. J. Schelling, *Clara oder über den Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt* (Leipzig: Philipp Reclam Jun. Verlag, 1913). Note that this edition is given without a date and is wrongly listed on p. 45 as coming after Ehrenberg's version in Schneeberger's bibliography (G. Schneeberger, *F. W. J. Schelling. Eine Bibliographie* [Bern: Francke Verlag, 1954]).

11. See n. 6 above.

12. M. Schröter, ed., "Introduction" and "Epilogue," in F. W. J. Schelling, *Clara oder über den Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt* (Munich: Leibniz Verlag, 1948), p. 134.

13. Schröter, p. 134.

14. Most commentators have simply taken Schröter at his word and have hence believed

ed a "Sketch" by Schelling outlining a plan that he (Schelling) had originally written for a work that was at least related to *Clara*.<sup>15</sup> This sketch was not present in any other single edition of *Clara*. Finally, in 1987 Dietzfelbinger edited a version of *Clara* without either the "Introduction," the "Spring" fragment, or the "Sketch."<sup>16</sup>

Summary of Content of All Known Single German Editions of *Clara* to Date

Edition	Introduction	Fourth Discussion	Spring Fragment	Sketch
K. F. A. Schelling, First Edition		✓	✓	
K. F. A. Schelling, Second Edition		✓	✓	
Kuhlenbeck Ehrenberg	✓	✓		
Schröter Dietzfelbinger		✓	✓	✓

This brief publication history of *Clara* should be enough to indicate that there is some disagreement as to which pieces of text belong to the work and which do not. There appears to be little consensus among the various editions of the work that have appeared. Moreover, and more surprisingly, there has been virtually no discussion of the reasons for inclusion or exclusion of various parts of text. My aim here is to bring out and to assess in some detail why each of the contested parts in the work might be included or excluded so as to give a general overview of the issues involved. Furthermore, many of these editions of *Clara* are now hard to obtain. Thus, a secondary aim of this essay is to keep the information about these editions in the public domain. For ease of reference I will refer to the first single edition of *Clara* as the "standard edition," but this is not meant to imply that this version is necessarily the best.

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that the Schröter edition is indeed the first single edition of *Clara* to include the "Spring" fragment. See, for example, Tilliette, p. 557, and H. Zeltner, *Schelling-Forschung seit 1954* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975), p. 6. However Horn remarks in a footnote (p. 39) that Schröter appears to have overlooked the previous publication of the "Spring" fragment. All page references to the "Spring" fragment of *Clara* are taken from K. F. A. Schelling (1862). As with the rest of *Clara*, all translations are my own unless otherwise stated.

15. See Schröter, p. 135.

16. K. Dietzfelbinger, ed., "Editor's Introduction," in F. W. J. Schelling, *Clara. Über den Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt* (Andechs: Dingfelder Verlag, 1987).

## THE "INTRODUCTION"

Of all single editions of *Clara*, the "Introduction" appears only in Kuhlenbeck's version that was published by Reclam. Nevertheless, in collected works of Schelling that contain *Clara*, the inclusion of the "Introduction" is much more frequent. Thus the "Introduction" appears in, for example, both the standard *Sämmtliche Werke* and the Jubiläum edition published in 1927. It is also included under *Clara* in Manfred Frank's selection of Schelling's works.<sup>17</sup>

The relatively frequent inclusion of the "Introduction" in what are arguably more scholarly collections of Schelling's works and its general exclusion in single editions of *Clara* might indicate that the decision to exclude the "Introduction" is purely economic. The eight-page "Introduction" is written in relatively tight, philosophical prose compared to the novel-like style of the *Clara* discussions themselves. Thus if the single editions are aimed toward a more popular audience—and this is certainly the case at least with the most recent Dietzfelbinger edition—the "Introduction" may well be excluded in order to retain the popular appeal of the work.

However, whether or not this is really the case, the editors themselves have often given other reasons for excluding the "Introduction." Ehrenberg, though arguing that the style of the "Introduction" would cloud the style that is so peculiar to *Clara*, baldly cites his main reason for excluding the "Introduction" as being that it simply does not belong to the work. He adds, furthermore, that there is no compelling reason for thinking the "Introduction" belongs to *Clara*.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, Ehrenberg does not expand on this point; the reader is simply asked to accept his judgment. Schröter too decided not to include the "Introduction" in his version of *Clara* on the grounds that it does not belong to the work. He maintains, without any references or arguments in support of this claim, that the "Introduction" belonged to a purely scientific investigation that was never continued by Schelling.<sup>19</sup> K. F. A. Schelling is a little more cautious in his introduction to the first single edition of *Clara* and says that he left out the "Introduction" because it does not bear any *direct* relation to the *Clara* discussion (emphasis added).<sup>20</sup>

If it really is the case that the "Introduction" does not belong to *Clara*, or at least does not sit comfortably with the work, one might wonder why

17. *Clara* is to be found in *F. W. J. Schelling. Ausgewählte Schriften. Band 4, 1804–1834*, ed. M. Frank (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985).

18. Ehrenberg, p. 17.

19. Schröter, p. 134.

20. K. F. A. Schelling (1862), p. iii.

Kuhlenbeck added it to his edition of *Clara*. Indeed, one might even expect to find in Kuhlenbeck's version some reason for including the "Introduction." Strangely, however, Kuhlenbeck gives no justification for his decision and even himself notes that the "Introduction" was not intended for *Clara* but for a different treatise.<sup>21</sup> It therefore appears that the inclusion or exclusion of the "Introduction" has been relatively arbitrary but also that virtually everyone agrees that it does not truly form a part of *Clara*. I wish to challenge this view and to argue that even if it transpires that the "Introduction" was not intended for *Clara*, its content is so relevant that it should be included in at least scholarly editions of the work. To do so I will begin by returning to the standard edition of Schelling's works.

In the *Sämmtliche Werke*, K. F. A. Schelling adds a footnote to the "Introduction" explaining that the "Introduction" was apparently not intended for a discussion, but for a treatise [*Abhandlung*].<sup>22</sup> However, he maintains in this footnote that the "Introduction" belongs to *Clara* insofar as the treatise was intended to have basically the same content as *Clara*. The title that was seemingly given by Schelling for this treatise was "A Presentation [*Darstellung*] of the Transition from a Philosophy of Nature to a Philosophy of the Spirit World." Moreover, K. F. A. Schelling notes, the manuscript of the "Introduction" was discovered bound up with the *Clara* discussion in the literary estate.<sup>23</sup>

Kuhlenbeck and Schröter refer to the "Introduction" respectively as one to a "treatise" or a "scientific investigation." It thus appears that rather than focusing on Schelling's own original title calling it an introduction to a "presentation," they have both taken over the son's description of it as part of a "treatise." This is not a trivial move. Indeed, what most clearly characterizes *Clara* is the many senses in which it is a "(re)presentational" work. The term *Darstellung* can mean presentation or representation. *Clara* "presents" its characters and the views of those characters almost as if on a stage. Furthermore, the characters are themselves "representations," with Clara portraying the soul and personality, the Priest representing the spirit, and the Doctor illustrating the natural and corporeal elements. Also, the very discussions that take place are intended as "representations" of the interactions and interrelationships between these three, as I will show in more detail later. Thus if the "Introduction" was originally entitled by Schelling as a (re)presentation rather than as a treatise, it is only a small step to think

21. Kuhlenbeck, p. 6.

22. The footnote can be found on p. 3 at the beginning of the "Introduction" in Volume 9 of the *Sämmtliche Werke*. Although Kuhlenbeck included the "Introduction" in his version of *Clara*, he did not publish this footnote.

23. The *Stuttgart Lectures* and drafts for the *Ages of the World* were also included in this bundle.

that perhaps the "Introduction" was intended for *Clara* after all. Although Schelling's *Presentation [Darstellung] of My System* was written like a series of mathematical deductions in the manner of Spinoza and may thus give cause to think that the term *Darstellung* refers to a more "scientific investigation," as Kühlenbeck and Schröter contend, in the section of *Clara* where the Priest and Clara discuss how philosophical ideas should be presented, *Darstellung* is used in a way much closer to (re)presentation. It is therefore not clear-cut whether the term *Darstellung* used by Schelling in the "Introduction" parallels the use of the term in his earlier work or in *Clara*.

Moreover, Schelling's son chose not to subtitle the *Clara* discussions by the title attached to the "Introduction" in the literary estate but chose instead to give them a different (but related) title. This too may have had more far-reaching consequences than intended by artificially removing *Clara* even further from the "Introduction" that was originally bound with the manuscript. This may have encouraged others to think that the "Introduction" did certainly belong to another work when the evidence for this view is not yet so clear and probably never will be. Indeed, there is a growing recognition among Schelling scholars that K. F. A. Schelling's editorial decisions may not always have been the best.<sup>24</sup>

The reasons outlined so far for including the "Introduction" as a part of *Clara* have been primarily historically based. Nevertheless, these historical considerations may not have played a major role in the exclusion of the "Introduction" from so many of the single editions of *Clara*. There may also be reasons based on the content of the "Introduction" itself that resulted in its exclusion from *Clara*, so I shall now turn my attention to this possibility.

Schröter argues that the "Introduction" does not properly belong to *Clara* because it was really intended for a purely scientific work. So far I have understood this assertion as based on Schelling's son's description of the "Introduction" as belonging to a "treatise" rather than to a "representation." However, there are ample places in the "Introduction" that could support Schröter's hypothesis of it as being intended to precede a scientific work.

In the "Introduction" Schelling maintains that if one thinks that nature is subordinate to the spirit world—and he makes it clear that he is presupposing the existence of a spirit world and that his aim is not to prove the existence of such a world—then there must already be a connection between that world and nature, with nature being the rung to the spirit world.

24. For example, see p. 729 in Walter E. Ehrhard's epilogue to his edition of F. W. J. Schelling, *Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung. Teilband 2* (Hamburg: Felix Mainer Verlag, 1992).

Following this Schelling holds that if anyone should take issue with the idea of explicating a connection between nature and the spirit world, then they would have to show that his (i.e., Schelling's) arguments or "proofs" of the existence of this connection do not hold. Because Schelling refers to "proofs," it may be correct to think that Schelling intended to write a work that would demonstrate purely logically and scientifically that there was a natural connection between nature and the spirit world. Indeed, in the "Introduction" Schelling himself refers to the work specifically as a "treatise." For example, he writes in the following passage: "In this treatise [*Abhandlung*] one will rarely find flights of imagination, particularly ones sought within the external, or find those certain light-hearted talks about the immortality of the soul that both writers and public alike seem so very much to enjoy" (p. 7). This, together with Schelling's frequent references to "formulae" and another reference to the "treatise" in the very last paragraph of the "Introduction," seems to point to a work very different from *Clara* with which the manuscript of the "Introduction" was bound.

Nevertheless, there are also places in the "Introduction" that support the idea that it was indeed intended for *Clara*. The introduction's difference in written style from the *Clara* discussions does not necessarily speak against it as belonging to *Clara*; Schelling may have wanted to justify and to prepare readers for his new and radical way of presenting philosophical ideas by using taut philosophical prose to secure the audience's initial interest. Moreover, toward the end of *Clara*—in the very last section in Ehrenberg's version of *Clara*—there is a discussion between Clara and the Priest about how philosophy should be communicated. This conversation can be understood as an attempt to justify the discursive novel as a means of conveying philosophical thought.<sup>25</sup> Thus, even within *Clara* Schelling feels a need to justify the approach he is taking. If this justification comes only toward the end of the discussions (although it is hard to know whether the justification would have come toward the end of the completed work), it is quite likely that a preliminary justification for the new method of writing would be necessary in the introduction to the conversations. And indeed much of the "Introduction"—particularly its latter half—focuses on the virtue of using an appropriate method.

Schelling writes, for example: "we will, where possible, give an example in this treatise of a method that differs from those heretofore in so far as it is quite inseparable from its content, with the method being given through the content as the content is through the method" (pp. 9–

25. R. Borlinghaus also understood *Clara* as Schelling's attempt to create a new way of bringing philosophy to life. See his book *Neue Wissenschaft. Schelling und das Projekt einer positiven Philosophie* (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 1994).



10). If these words are applicable to any work of Schelling's, they are applicable to *Clara* which itself differs radically from any of Schelling's works heretofore.

Indeed, in *Clara* the method is most certainly inseparable from the content. For instance, as I have already noted, the conversational form itself represents the three elements—or potencies, as they are later characterized in the *Ages of the World*—and the way in which each element tries to gain dominance. That is, the Doctor always argues for the importance of the body and nature, the Priest for the spiritual and mental, and Clara for the soul and personality. Each argues in turn against the other until the conversation comes to a natural stopping point. For Schelling this is exactly the role and interplay of the three elements or potencies. Only a conversational form can illustrate Schelling's ideas so accurately. Thus, in the second section of the standard edition of *Clara* the Doctor and Clara argue about the importance of nature, and the third section begins with a long discussion between the Priest and Clara, in which the Priest tries to elucidate the relations between body, spirit, and soul, and Clara intervenes occasionally with her views. The Doctor then enters in and again argues for the importance of the body, and then all three discuss the spirit world. The fourth section contains the discussions about philosophy and representational form. So each of the three elements has its turn at dominating the discussion, just as each element (body, mind, or soul) must also take its turn at being the ruling feature. Only Clara perhaps does not have her turn at truly dominating and leading the discussion, but this point will be addressed later.

Another example of the overall structure of *Clara* echoing the content can be found in the first section where, appropriately, the Doctor cuts the conversation with the clergyman of the cloister, who has argued from ungrounded speculations.<sup>26</sup> The Doctor counters the clergyman by saying that “we must especially give up the thought of deriving life from something different and higher as if we were simply wanting to grasp that. Not top down but bottom up is my motto” (p. 21). That is, just as Schelling argues in the “Introduction” that “Modern philosophy did away with its immediate reference to nature. . . . Continuing its claims to a higher world, it was no longer metaphysics but hyperphysics. Only now did its complete incapacity for its proposed aim emerge. Because it wanted to spiritualize itself completely, it first of all threw away the stuff that was absolutely necessary to the process and right from the beginning it kept only what was

26. In his article “Clara. Über Schellings gleichnamiges Fragment” (*Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 51 [1997], pp. 590–610), Alexander Grau notes that Schelling uses the clergyman in this short passage to represent Kant.

spiritual” (pp. 3–4), the Doctor here argues against the Clergyman that nature and not a spiritualized philosophy must be the starting point. The following discussion between Clara and the Doctor reinforces this point, the Doctor’s views of nature getting the discussion into its first cycle. Indeed, the general structure of *Clara*—and of the *Ages of the World*, too—is specifically offered, again appropriately, by the Priest when he asks “Are we able to say at all of any of the three that one alone is exclusively that which links the others . . . and doesn’t each one become the means again of linking the others?” (p. 46).

Not only is the overall methodical structure of *Clara* itself an illustration of the content, but the content also comes alive even in the very details of the narration. There are many examples, but here I will provide just two. In the conversation with the Doctor in the second section, the Doctor gives the view that progress lies not in standing still or in looking back but in movement and that evil consists in a backward movement of human nature and in a refusal to die with the whole for the sake of progress. He ends by claiming that activity is of worth in and of itself. This is followed by the subsequent telling passage: “I know that inner strength, Clara said getting up to go back, and I have found that it can raise us above everything external but I also know that before it even knows it, the best inner being gets tied up in a contradiction with the external world” (p. 36). Here, Clara “gets up to go back”—that is, she moves, but moves back. The backwards movement is symbolic of her looking back to her relationship to Albert and to her own refusal to let go. The movement itself is symbolic of her nevertheless not standing still, of her trying to come to terms with her situation, and the “getting up to go back” is itself the contradiction that the best inner being gets entangled with the external world. That is, Schelling’s very description of the characters and their movements echo the content of the text. A second example is in Clara’s conversation with the Priest. The passage runs as follows with Clara speaking first and the Priest responding:

In moments like this, she continued, my conviction needs no reason; I see everything as if it were present; to me it feels as if the spirit life were already embracing even me . . . why can’t we hold on to these moments?

Perhaps, I said in reply, this level of profundity isn’t compatible with the limitations of our present life, whose destiny appears to be such that everything will be explained and recognized only bit by bit. (pp. 41–42)

So too, then, in the discussions, each step is taken bit by bit. Each character offers a particular view, interacting with the others until a whole is formed. This passage too, incidentally, has echoes of the “Introduction” within it, for in the “Introduction” Schelling writes: “In his undertakings, even scientific ones, Man errs not through what he undertakes to do, but

in the way he does it; namely by not taking his knowledge step by step" (p. 7). These passages, therefore, give us some pause to consider whether the "Introduction" is so irrelevant to *Clara* as some commentators appear to have thought; the sections cited above appear to illustrate that *Clara* does indeed have a method that is inseparable from its content.

This defense of the "Introduction" as being at least relevant to the *Clara* discussions is not based solely on the interaction between method and content. There are several parts of the "Introduction" that suggest other ways in which the "Introduction" and the *Clara* discussions are linked. For instance, Schelling writes of the method he is to use that "more than a few of its formulae have been shamefully misused (whose innermost being no one has yet completely penetrated), by treating what is most living mainly with reason" (p. 10). Although the word "formulae" may have a strictly scientific flavor, Schelling talks of the formulae as being misused insofar as they are treated mainly with reason. That is, if the formulae are understood as the interplay of the three elements that are mirrored at every level, then a purely reasoned approach (perhaps, for example, Hegel's use of contradiction) is for Schelling the wrong way to depict the interplay. The Platonic tone of some of the dialogues in *Clara* also suggests that Schelling might be referring to Platonic dialogue when he writes "that in cases of real investigation where . . . the formulae have been conceded to have a certain influence, the method proves itself to be more beneficial than the usual one" (p. 10).<sup>27</sup>

In addition, Schelling writes in the penultimate paragraph of the "Introduction":

In so far as his concern is purely to achieve an effect, an author can hardly fail to achieve his aim with a subject that bears a manifold and intimate relationship to the deepest feelings of human kind, if he knows how to introduce these feelings in an unobtrusive and pleasant way. However, he who tries to produce these feelings by using precise = scientific insight must wish to silence them from the beginning. (p. 9)

Here, then, it is clear that insofar as Schelling's topic is life after death—that is, a subject that bears an intimate relationship to the deepest feelings of mankind—it is unlikely that Schelling can be wishing to introduce a treatise that is scientific in the traditional sense of the word.

27. Schelling was a great admirer of Plato and in the preface to *Philosophy and Religion*, he refers to a dialogue he was writing that had "tones of ancient philosophy." This dialogue may have been an early version of *Clara*. Needless to say, the dialogue was often used as a literary form in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For a discussion, see Jürgen Wertheimer, 'Der Güter Gefährlichstes, die Sprache.' *Zur Krise des Dialogs zwischen Aufklärung und Romantik* (Munich: Fink, 1990) or Rudolf Hirzel, *Der Dialog. Ein literarhistorischer Versuch*, 2 Bde (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1895).

Dietzfelbinger has maintained that Schelling is an “intuitive philosopher.” Indeed, if we take philosophy as related to science insofar as it aims to construct logical arguments, then—given that Schelling writes in the “Introduction” that “one shouldn’t suspect those seeking certainty of knowledge even in the most spiritual objects of fanciful imagination or of trying to lead people to so imagine” (p. 8), along with his references to a “treatise” and to “formulae”—it does seem plausible that Schelling may have wanted to support in part a “scientific intuitionism” view. And although Schelling says that the treatise will not generally include flights of imagination or light-hearted talks about the immortality of the soul, there are passages within *Clara* that could be described as fanciful (as I will discuss in the next section). However, *Clara* is also only a fragment and was never intended for publication. Indeed, Tilliette writes that Schelling’s literary will consigned *Clara* to destruction.<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, I hope that my brief arguments in this section help to show that the terms “formulae” and “treatise” may not necessarily indicate that Schelling was planning a strictly scientific work in the traditional sense.

In sum, there is no concrete evidence that the “Introduction” was not intended for *Clara*, and it seems a hasty step for so many editors of *Clara* to have excluded it from their editions of the work without an explanation of more than a couple of cursory sentences. Obviously, insofar as the “Introduction” and *Clara* were to deal with similar topics, it is not surprising that the two texts should bear some strong similarities, but Schelling’s comments on the interrelationship between method and content are very telling. It might not be that the two texts were to deal with similar topics, but that the two texts were in fact the very same. It is a mystery that Schelling himself took to the grave.

#### THE FOURTH DISCUSSION

Only Ehrenberg took the bold step of omitting a large chunk of Schelling’s text in order to produce what he thought was a more rounded and structurally coherent version of *Clara*. Was this move justified?

To a certain extent Ehrenberg’s version—which omits the “Introduction” and everything after the discussion about how to represent philosophy—is tighter. The first section of *Clara* is clearly introductory, the second scene is a discussion between the Doctor and Clara (the interaction between nature and soul), followed by a discussion between the Priest and Clara (the interaction between spirit and soul), and the Doctor enters in

28. In Horn, p. ix.

at the end so that all three discuss together. This version is a good illustration of the interaction and coordination of the elements that are at play. The final section discussing the nature of philosophy and the benefits of the discursive form then rounds off Ehrenberg's edition of *Clara* into a coherent and relatively balanced whole. Ehrenberg does not spell out this structure of the discussions in his introduction to his *Clara* edition, but it is clear that there is some strong justification for holding that his version is structurally more coherent.

What is less clear is whether Ehrenberg was right to deem the part of *Clara* that he alone omitted to be of so little worth. I will not discuss the "Spring" fragment or the "Sketch" here, since the latter had not come to light and the former had apparently been forgotten at the date of Ehrenberg's publication of *Clara*. Thus I will consider here only the omitted "fourth discussion" that was retained in all other editions of *Clara*—even those appearing after Ehrenberg's. Ehrenberg explains:

I could not consider it right to keep what followed [on from this last discussion between the Priest and Clara about using representational forms to portray philosophical thought]; what follows does not have the same worth as what preceded it, it contains many repetitions and it perhaps represents only another version of the text, a version that may easily emerge as a part in drafting a text, but which would be removed on its completion and besides, with its lack of conclusion, it is rather distracting. (p. 17)

Again, there is clearly some justification for Ehrenberg's view, even if he himself does not defend it any further than what I have just cited. The omitted text does have a number of repetitions and I will give just a few examples here. First, there are repetitions within the remaining text itself. For instance, the Priest asks "how can we hope to determine anything about the spirit world if we don't yet know what the limits of the visible one are?" (p. 93). Just eight very short paragraphs later he states almost the very same thing by responding, "I will try to turn my mind's eye to the invisible heaven as soon as you or any other friend has relieved me of my ignorance about this visible one" (p. 94). Moreover, this "bottom up" approach is reminiscent of the starting point desired in both the first section and in the controversial "Introduction." But this fourth discussion is one that clearly comes later in *Clara*, as it is set at the beginning of Spring and the former conversations took place in Autumn, Christmas, and Winter. If we understand *Clara* as I believe Ehrenberg wished it to be interpreted—such that the discussion about the spirit world is understood as taking place only when all three elements or characters interact, for only then can they ascend to a realm beyond nature—then the section following this discussion should not try to start from the beginning because the relevant elements have already progressed beyond that. Although it is

possible that Schelling could have aimed to rotate the sequence again in illustration of its endless cycle, this seems unlikely. The content of the fourth discussion is one about the higher realms, and Spring and Summer discussions are still required to complete the temporal structure of the piece.

Secondly, there are repetitions of earlier points that do not particularly add to the fourth discussion but which are already covered in previous sections. For example, the Priest argues in the last section:

if we may imagine the living, continual creation as a rotation, as it were, in which the corporeal is continually raised into the spiritual and the spiritual is lowered into the corporeal until both elements have more or less suffused with each other and become one, then this rotation would have reached its true purpose only when the highest and most spiritual had descended to the most corporeal and when similarly the very lowest and coarsest had risen up to the most spiritual and transfigured. Thus over the course of times . . . the appearance of the purest and most spiritual would have become necessary. (p. 107)

This, however, is basically the same in content to the previous discussion at Christmas where the Priest postulates:

If . . . the external were so completely suffused by the internal that it had in itself both what recognizes and what is recognized and if in turn the internal had the external posited in it in such a way that what recognizes also contained what is recognized within it and if both of these were at the same time, so that the external so conceived were together with an internal so conceived, then this would indeed be called the most blessed and perfect life of all. (pp. 58–59)

Again, it is possible that the thought is repeated in the last section because each section is, in a sense, supposed to repeat the thoughts of the former ones in an upwards rotation or spiral, but this would need some argument and is far from being a clearly feasible explanation.

Ehrenberg's claim that this final discussion does not have the same worth as the prior sections also finds some justification. There is, for instance, an apparent fancifulness in many of the passages in this section. For example, in his long speech the Priest explains "because I found it impossible that inner or spiritual nature had all along been as separate from external nature as it now appears to us to be, I assumed that everything had become like this through the separation and distribution of powers from a divine chaos" (p. 98). That is, the Priest is no longer working from the bottom up, but is being led by his own belief. Another similar passage follows on the same page, when he continues to speculate:

if it is additionally supposed, and there are many reasons for so doing, that it wasn't until a later corruption occurred that a part of the universe became completely separated from spiritual nature, then if this part of the universe

is not to sink completely and if it is to be used as material for a higher purpose at the same time, then it is all the more necessary to suppose that what is still living and spiritual should be set against what is now dead through a new process of separation and so a new path of development should be introduced through which divine fruits can still be produced even from the ruined element.

Here too the Priest works from his own speculations rather than constructing arguments from what is known. It may well be that it is passages such as these that cause Ehrenberg concern.

Nevertheless, it is not so clear that a concern is justified. Indeed, in the "Introduction" Schelling warns "one shouldn't suspect those seeking certainty of knowledge even in the most spiritual objects of fanciful imagination" (p. 104), and it is possible that in this fourth discussion Schelling is offering a quest for knowledge within the spiritual rather than within the world. There are numerous indications within this final section to support this hypothesis about Schelling's intent here. For instance, early in this section the Priest complains "what those who teach about the stars say they have discovered about the structure of the world as a whole doesn't have the slightest internal probability for me and what I would find internally probable no-one has yet discovered" (p. 94). Thus it is clear here that the approach is not "bottom up." Clara subsequently invites him to say what he finds probable in accordance with his own feeling, but symbolically the Priest refuses to do so until they have gone further up. Equally symbolically, only then do they see for the first time the whole lake which Clara had longed to see. She explains: "We spoke so much and so often about the spirit life and then the picture of the lake would always stand before my eyes" (p. 92). The Doctor adds "The lake is a picture of the past, of eternal peace and of isolation." Seeing the lake from above, then, is symbolic both of looking back at the world as something that is past and of speaking from the realm of the spirit. Indeed, the whole of the Priest's long speech from the top takes a much broader view, discussing the nature of the universe, the relationship between planets, and speculations about the spirit world.

Schelling is not insensible to the speculative nature of the Priest's long speech, and the passage that follows this speech is in essence a justification and explanation for why the Priest's speculations belong to *Clara*. In this passage a woman comes up to them and recounts how her swearing an oath to St. Walderich had saved her son's life. Again, it is symbolic that the woman does not confess her story—her own belief—until she too comes up to the top. This story inspires the three main protagonists to discuss the effect of belief on the world, and they appropriately broach this topic as they start their descent. That is, for Schelling the spirit world and the world of belief have an effect on our actions in the world. Just as

there is a connection between nature and the spirit world, so too there is one between the spirit world and nature. We are led not only by our natural desires but also by our mental convictions. Once the three main characters in the story have descended again, the conversation suitably returns to the pull and attraction of earthly life.

For these reasons, then, the fourth discussion in *Clara* evidently has its own purpose to fulfill and there are the same indications as to a generally carefully structured text. Thus Ehrenberg's criticism of it as not having the same worth as the previous sections does not seem to be justified. Moreover, although the text is broken off at the end and is distracting, it is a more honest portrayal of *Clara* as a clearly incomplete work. It would be a great shame for Schelling scholars if this final section were standardly omitted from editions of *Clara*. Fortunately, however, this has not generally been the case.

#### THE "SPRING" FRAGMENT

Accounts about the appearance of the first publication of the "Spring" fragment are surprisingly inconsistent. Schröter explicitly says that he brought out the 1948 edition of *Clara* because of the finding of a new fragment (Epilogue, p. 134). Most commentators appear to have assumed that Schröter was correct, with Zeltner noting that the "Spring" fragment had been published by Schröter before in 1946 in a volume of original transcripts of the *Ages of the World* and other fragments of text.<sup>29</sup> However, in fact the "Spring" fragment was present in K. F. A. Schelling's very first single edition of *Clara* in 1862; the fragment was also present in the second edition in 1865. It is quite astonishing that Schröter should have overlooked this as he explicitly mentions the first two single editions of *Clara* in the epilogue to his edition of *Clara* (see p. 134). Equally surprisingly, Ehrenberg makes no comment about having omitted the "Spring" fragment from his edition of the work. He presumably simply took *Clara* from the *Sämtliche Werke* rather than from the single edition of the work and thus unwittingly consigned the "Spring" fragment to obscurity for the next three decades. In 1944 the Munich literary estate was burned in a fire which is presumably what caused Schröter to return to what was left of the original documents and to "rediscover" the "Spring" fragment.

However, there are some differences between Schröter's and K. F. A. Schelling's versions of the fragment. Most differences are only small, the

29. See Hermann Zeltner, *Schelling-Forschung seit 1954* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975), pp. 6-7.



largest residing in the final paragraph of the fragment. In Schröter's version Clara is the sole interlocutor in the whole fragment, whereas in K. F. A. Schelling's edition the last two sentences from Schröter form a new paragraph of one sentence attributed to the Priest. In K. F. A. Schelling's version the fragment also ends with ellipses, whereas in Schröter's it ends with a full stop, thus giving the final sentence a different character. There are a few other minor differences too.

Nevertheless, despite Schröter's excitement over the putatively new find, the "Spring" fragment is barely three pages long. The whole fragment, apart from a few lines of scenic description, is largely or wholly a long speech by Clara. The first half of the speech is characterized by a series of questions that outline Clara's views. The following is a good example of one such question: "Don't these very same powers that still emerge as separate and conflicting in inorganic beings emerge united and in accord as organic ones, and in a higher sense isn't it these very same powers that maintain the conflict in our current life and in this respect aren't we actually standing just at the very first stage of life?" (p. 176–77). By placing this in the form of a question, Clara's outburst gains a speculative character, although the thoughts are clearly in line with those presented in earlier discussions in *Clara*. The many questions in the first half of this "Spring" fragment echo the nature of Spring and its promise of things to come. Nevertheless, just as the question just cited repeats thoughts already expressed before, other passages in this short fragment are likewise basically repetitions. Thus, to a certain extent, Ehrenberg's criticisms of the fourth discussion may be more applicable to this short fragment instead.

Indeed, just as the fourth discussion was set at the beginning of Spring with the three characters climbing to the top, they appear to have done the same in this fragment, for Schelling writes "Roughly so did Clara address us in the first days of Spring when we were on the hill from which she could see the beloved country of her native land" (pp. 178–79). Moreover, Clara's speeches immediately after this short descriptive paragraph serve simply to echo previous lines of thought—for instance, "Indeed, [nature] is currently submitted to the law of externality and even she and everything that lives within her must go through both forms of life one after the other, which, in accordance with her fate, she couldn't immediately unite" (pp. 179–80). This line of thought is familiar both in *Clara* and the *Ages of the World*.

Horn, on the other hand, appears to think that the "Spring" fragment (which he names "Clara II") demonstrates a "strange break" from the preceding dialogues.<sup>30</sup> On Horn's reading of *Clara* the preceding dia-

30. See Horn, p. 43.

logues argued for a proper ordering of the three principles or elements *immediately* after death, whereas in the “Spring” fragment the proper ordering is postponed until the final judgment.<sup>31</sup> A full discussion of Horn’s reading deserves fuller treatment than I can give here, but there are reasons for casting doubt on his interpretation. For example, in the Christmas discussion (pp. 81–85) the Priest has already speculated that there may be many realms between death and true bliss, thus indicating that even prior to the “Spring” fragment Schelling had not necessarily thought that the three principles were in their proper order immediately after death. Furthermore, in the preceding passages the transition from this world to the next one is merely portrayed as a *change* in the ordering of the principles, of a transition to a higher order (to the rule of the spirit), and not necessarily to a “proper” ordering of the principles.

However, some commentators have argued that the “Sketch” outlines what the “Spring” fragment was supposed to cover. It may therefore be wise to consider the “Spring” fragment in conjunction with the “Sketch”; indeed in discussing the “Sketch” I shall provide a further reason as to why I disagree with Horn’s reading.

#### THE “SKETCH”

There is some controversy over whether the “Sketch” found on the reverse side of the “Spring” fragment is a sketch for the further development of the fragment or whether it is a sketch for the *Ages of the World*. Schröter clearly believes the former, describing the “Sketch” as “a hint of an intended continuation of this line of thought [in the “Spring” fragment]” (p. 135). Horn, however, maintains that the first heading of the “Sketch,” “Reality of the spirit world (of the past),” clearly refers to the first book of the *Ages of the World*, and thus the “Sketch” is an outline not for the continuation of *Clara* but for the structure of the first book of the *Ages of the World*, which is itself called “the past.” Horn argues that the “Sketch” cannot refer to a possible continuation of the *Clara* discussions as the ideas in the “Sketch” have all been thoroughly discussed in the rest of *Clara* already. Schelling’s son thought differently again. He believed that *Clara* itself was the outline for the third book of the *Ages of the World* (“the future of things”). Thus, presumably, the “Sketch” too would be a further outline of that outline (i.e., a sketch for *Clara* as a whole).

From the content of the “Sketch” itself, Horn does seem to be justified in saying that the topics it proposes have been covered within the other

31. Horn, pp. 96–97.

*Clara* discussions. Topics in the “Sketch” include “the perfect humanity of spirits” as the second heading, thus tying up with Schelling’s arguments that spirit needs not only body but also soul (that which is human in people) and that all three aspects follow after bodily death. The third heading of the “Sketch,” which has various subsections, is largely concerned with clairvoyance, its immediacy, and with an intermediary stage between bliss and misfortune. Again, the *Clara* discussions deal with clairvoyance, the immediate action of the spiritual on the physical, and the many realms that might follow after death.

Nevertheless, although the topics have been dealt with before this does not exclude the possibility that Schelling may have wished to have introduced them again and to have developed them further. In the “Spring” fragment Clara says that “Bliss is freedom and the rule of the soul” (pp. 177–78), and the domination of Clara in this fragment indicates that this section was to show the soul or the person in the ruling position. Previous discussions have had the Doctor and the Priest as dominant, so this would be a logical progression for Schelling to take. In addition the “Sketch” includes the question: “Whether the condition of clairvoyance is also applicable to damnation and whether there isn’t an intermediary condition between bliss and misfortune?” This question suggests that Schelling may have been looking to develop clairvoyance as a human, essentially intermediary and soul-like aspect in his philosophy. Indeed, in previous sections clairvoyance has already been introduced as a state that approximates the next life and perhaps links our current world to the future one. To this extent clairvoyance certainly is a feature that parallels the role of the soul. Thus a further in-depth treatment of clairvoyance would be most appropriately exposed in a section where Clara is the ruling element.

If my suggestions in the previous paragraph are correct, then the passage that Horn cites in favor of the “Spring” fragment representing a radical break from Schelling’s previous thoughts—the passage he cites runs: “Do not be surprised, she continued [. . .] at this sudden speech [. . .]. I have not found peace until I was forced into thoughts about the end of all ends”<sup>32</sup>—is not a sudden leap as Horn contends, but a natural progression. *Clara* clearly has a progressive, stepwise approach to its matter and logically the three elements cannot have found their peace until the whole work is completed. In this reading Clara has to dominate the next major section, and she cannot be happy with what has gone before.

It is generally understood that *Clara* was originally to take place over the

32. Horn, p. 97, Dole’s translation of Schelling. This passage is to be found on p. 97 of *Clara* (SW, Vol. 9).

four seasons and thus, as well as the rest of the Spring section, the Summer section too is missing from the text (or was never written). There is an indication within the Autumn sections that Clara later dies (voluntarily), and thus Summer would presumably be the section where, in keeping with previous sections, death is characterized as something that is necessary for the whole to progress (to Summer, to heaven). It is also suitable that the hint of the future (Clara's death) should be present already in the Autumn section, because for Schelling each part always contains the others. Moreover, because the soul represents the essentially connecting element of the three (body/Doctor, soul/Clara, spirit/Priest), it is fitting that Clara's forthcoming death should have been intended to link the future text with the beginning and to make it a whole.

If my speculations about the intended structure of the final *Clara* text are correct, then the "Sketch" is most appropriate as a description of what might have been covered in the "Spring" fragment had it been completed, for the Summer section would have to cover death and perfection or completion and would not be a discussion about intermediary stages between bliss and misfortune. Unfortunately, though, we will probably never discover what this final section was to hold.

#### CONCLUSION

In this single essay it is impossible to give a thorough discussion of the virtues or otherwise of the individual parts that various editors have decided to omit from *Clara*. My aim here has been merely to illustrate how each of the contested parts fit in or otherwise with the overall text. I have also stressed the differences between the various editions as this has often been overlooked; moreover, much of this information is in danger of being lost as the various editions become harder to obtain. I hope that my thoughts may provoke others' interest so that our understanding of *Clara* can be advanced. It is perhaps strangely appropriate that *Clara* remains only as a fragment, for it was with precisely this problem—in other words, the problem of the knowledge people take with them to the grave—that Schelling himself was grappling in this work. Thus his problem fittingly becomes our problem.